Journal of Social Computing
Volume 2

Issue 4

Article 6

2021

Critical Technical Awakenings
Maya Malik
School of Social Work, McGill University, Montréal, H3A 0G4, Canada

Momin M. Malik
Institute in Critical Quantitative, Computational, & Mixed Methodologies, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, MD 21218, USA

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.tsinghuajournals.com/journal-of-social-computing

Recommended Citation
Malik, Maya and Malik, Momin M. (2021) "Critical Technical Awakenings," Journal of Social Computing:
Vol. 2: Iss. 4, Article 6.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.23919/JSC.2021.0035
Available at: https://dc.tsinghuajournals.com/journal-of-social-computing/vol2/iss4/6

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by Tsinghua University Press: Journals Publishing.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Social Computing by an authorized editor of Tsinghua University
Press: Journals Publishing.

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL COMPUTING
ISSN 2688-5255 06/06 pp365−384
Volume 2, Number 4, December 2021
DOI: 1 0 . 2 3 9 1 9 / J S C . 2 0 2 1 . 0 0 3 5

Critical Technical Awakenings
Maya Malik and Momin M. Malik*
Abstract: Starting with Philip E. Agre’s 1997 essay on “critical technical practice”, we consider examples
of writings from computer science where authors describe “waking up” from a previously narrow technical
approach to the world, enabling them to recognize how their previous efforts towards social change had been
ineffective. We use these examples first to talk about the underlying assumptions of a technology-centric
approach to social problems, and second to theorize these awakenings in terms of Paulo Freire’s idea of critical
consciousness. Specifically, understanding these awakenings among technical practitioners as examples of this
more general phenomenon gives guidance for how we might encourage and guide critical awakenings in order
to get more technologists working effectively towards positive social change.
Key words: critical technical practice; critical consciousness; perspective transformation; education; machine
learning

1

Introduction

In 1997, then-UCLA professor Philip E. Agre published
a remarkable essay, entitled “Towards a Critical
Technical Practice: Lessons Learned in Trying to
Reform AI” [1]. In it, Agre describes his experience as a
doctoral student in AI at MIT in the 1980s undergoing
a crisis of faith in his discipline and looking to other
disciplines for answers. Agre writes (bold emphasis
added):
“As an AI practitioner already well immersed in the
AI literature, I had incorporated the field’s taste for
technical formalization so thoroughly into my own
cognitive style that I literally could not read the
literatures of nontechnical fields at anything beyond
a popular level. The problem was not exactly that I
could not understand the vocabulary, but that I insisted
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on trying to read everything as a narration of the
workings of a mechanism.
“My first intellectual breakthrough came when, for
reasons I do not recall, it finally occurred to me to stop
translating these strange disciplinary languages into
technical schemata, and instead simply to learn them on
their own terms.
“I still remember the vertigo I felt during this
period; I was speaking these strange disciplinary
languages, in a wobbly fashion at first, without knowing
what they meant—without knowing what sort of
meaning they had... in retrospect this was the period
during which I began to ‘wake up’, breaking out of
a technical cognitive style that I now regard as
extremely constricting.”
In this paper, we use Agre’s essay as a foil to discuss
what we call critical technical awakenings: when people
from technical disciplines, previously committed to a
narrow technical view of the world, “wake up” from that
perspective to what we identify as seeing the world
through a critical, constructivist lens.
Other articles in this special issue do a fantastic job of
analyzing the political economy of tech ethics[2, 3]. While
recognizing that structural change at this level is our
ultimate goal, our focus here is in taking up a specific
slice of how to achieve this: what makes certain technical
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practitioners come to care about understanding this
larger context, and how do some individuals become
committed to working towards structural change? We do
not mean to imply that “ethics” are a problem at the level
of individuals; but, as we will argue, individual-level
awakenings play a central role in building communities
that effectively work towards positive structural change,
and so are crucial to consider.
Our goal is not necessarily to convince people purely
within a “technical perspective” that they should change
(indeed, we argue that rational argumentation alone is
insufficient to cause change), but rather to speak to
people who are in the process of undergoing, or who
have recently undergone, the type of awakening we
identify. Awakenings can be a lonely and confusing
process, but need not be. By pointing to existing
examples and theorizing this process, and by providing
guidance about how to productively channel and shape
awakenings, we hope to make it less difficult to go
through an awakening, and thereby encourage and
contribute to growing a community of critical technical
practitioners within modern data practice and
technology design.
Specifically, we aim to:
• Review the existence of different ways of
approaching the world and their different underlying
assumptions (in Section 2);
• Identify what is initially compelling about a
“technical perspective”, but how and why some of its
adherents rightly come to see this perspective as
insufficient (in Section 3);
• Draw on Paulo Freire’s idea of critical consciousness
and subsequent theory from adult education[4], in order
to theorize critical awakenings more broadly (in Section
4);
• Present a specific view of ethics and argue that this
should be the goal of critical technical awakenings (in
Section 5);
• Examine potential shortcomings of existing
examples of critical technical awakenings in light of
adult education’s prescriptive positions on what makes
a “complete” awakening, and by advocating for a
care-based ethical code which the examples do not seem
to have arrived at (in Section 6).
As a note, the awakenings we discuss are not technical
in nature. Perhaps “critical-technical awakenings”,
“critical awakenings in tech”, or “critical sociotechnical
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awakenings” would be more appropriate; we use the
phrase “critical technical awakenings” to emphasize a
connection to Agre’s critical technical practice and, in
contrast to other examples of people writing about
“critical awakenings”[5, 6] to emphasize the awakenings
in question being experienced by people in technical
fields.

2

Paradigms of Social Research

Training in social research includes, as a basic part of any
research methods course, an introduction to different
research paradigms. For people who carry out social
research from a technical background, this may not be
something they have been exposed to; but even if it is,
the abstract layout of different paradigms may not be
meaningful. To set up the remainder of the discussion,
we first present our take on the standard view of the
contours of social research in Table 1, with further
descriptions in a glossary Appendix, and try to point out
how it relates to a technical perspective versus what
people might awake to.
The rows correspond to subfields of philosophy, but
here more specifically and narrowly represent types of
assumptions within that philosophical domain,
respectively about the nature of things (ontology), how
we can know things (epistemology), and how we
actually go about knowing things (methodology). While
not always present in charts like this one, axiology is an
additional branch of philosophy that contains ethics
(what is good) and aesthetics (what is beautiful). Within
this, we specifically care about normative ethics, which
are choices of codes of conduct to which we should
adhere (which are how we go about being ethical), as
opposed to, say, descriptive ethics (descriptions of what
certain people believe to be ethical).
The columns represent different paradigms of social
research, and the cells are the assumptions that each
paradigm makes. These assumptions are fundamental
and foundational, and cannot be debated, justified, or
refuted through empirical means (since, among other
things, these assumptions are about the very possibility,
reliability, and even definition of empirical evidence). In
the Appendix, we provide a glossary with extensive
descriptions of these columns and some specific terms
that appear in the cells.
Neither the rows nor the columns are cleanly separated
or singular; positions can bleed into one another, and a
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Table 1 Assumptions of social research paradigms. Based on Guba and Lincoln’s “Basic beliefs (metaphysics) of alternative
inquiry paradigms”[7]. See Appendix for details.
Issue

Positivism

Ontology
(assumptions
about the
nature of
things)

Naïve realism. Reality
is independent of and
prior to human
conception of it, and
apprehensible.

Postpositivism

Critical theory

Constructivism

Participatory

Critical realism: Reality Disenchantment theory: Relativism: There are Participative: multiple
is independent of and there is a reality, shaped multiple realities and realities, each coprior to human
by social, political,
experiences of truth, constructed through
conception of it, but
cultural, economic,
constructed in history interactions between
only imperfectly and
ethnic, and gender
through social
specific people and
approximately
values and solidified
processes.
environments.
apprehensible.
over time, but it is
secret/hidden.
Epistemology Reality is knowable
Findings are
The truth of findings is Relativistic: there
We come to know
(assumptions through reason and
provisionally true;
mediated by their value; is no neutral or
things, and create new
about how
observation. It is
multiple descriptions how we come to know objective perspective understandings that can
can know
possible to have
can be valid but are
something, or who
from which to
transform the world, by
things)
findings that are
probably equivalent;
comes to know
adjudicate competing involving other people
singular, perspective- findings can be
something, matters for perspective or truth in the process of
independent and
affected/distorted by
how meaningful it is. claims; truth is
inquiry.
neutral, atemporal, and social and cultural
relative to a given
therefore universally
factors.
perspective.
true.
Methodology Experimental/
Modified experimental/ Dialogic (through
Dialetical, or
Collaborative, action(how we go manipulative
manipulative;
conversation and
hermeneutical (a
focused; flattening
about trying to (hypotheticofalsification of
debate) or dialectical
process of reading
researcher/
know things) deductive); hypotheses hypotheses; primacy of (through a process of sources “against
participant hierarchies;
can be verified as true. quantitative methods, thesis, antithesis, and a themselves” to
engaging in self- and
Chiefly quantitative
but may include
synthesis which
identify
collective reflection;
methods, and
qualitative and mixed becomes a new thesis) inconsistencies,
jointly deciding to
mathematical
methods.
underlying
engage in individual or
representation.
assumptions, or
collective action.
implicit messages,
and thereby interpret
meaning).
Axiology
Knowledge achieved Knowledge achieved Marginalization is what Understanding the
Everyone is valuable.
(ethics;
through hypothetico- through hypothetico- is most important;
process of
Reflexivity, co-created
values; who deductive means is
deductive is more
experience of
construction is what knowledge, and nonmatters, who more valuable than
valuable, but can be
marginalization
is valuable; value
western ways of
is important, other knowledge. The distorted by
provides unique
(including valuing
knowing are valuable
who has
people who can carry social/cultural factors, insights, and the
understanding the
and combat erasure and
standing)
out such investigation and this can sometimes knowledge of the
process of
dehumanization.
have privileged access only be uncovered by marginalized is more construction) is
to the truth, and thus
qualitative means and valuable than the
relative to a given
have a special role and insight. Qualitative
knowledge of
perspective.
importance (and
methods can provide
dominant/legitimate
potentially a special
checks and context, or paradigms.
responsibility).
raw material
for quantification.

single column can cover a variety of irreconcilable
different perspectives (for example, logical positivism
tries to remove the ontological assumptions of realism
from positivism’s quantitative empirical commitments,
and conversely, mathematical realism often disdains
empiricism). We identify the purest form of a “technical
perspective” as falling squarely within the “positivism”
column, but the perspective we discuss is more

specifically about the power of technology to effect
social change.①
These columns are not exhaustive or mutually
exclusive, but represent useful clusters. But, even
① This includes the perspective of technological determinism, a
position largely rejected in social science that holds that given technology
inherently effects certain causal changes, independent of context. See
Green’s article in this special issue[8] for details. A softer version allows
for context as a moderator, but still sees technology as having inherent
causal power.
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beyond this, as individuals we human beings can be
inconsistent or even contradictory in the sets of
assumptions we make (crossing multiple columns at
different times or even at once), and we may not even be
self-aware of the underlying assumptions we are making.
Technical disciplines in particular are frequently
positivist without realizing that it is a specific position,
or that it is not the only way to see the world. Part of
undergoing a critical awakening is coming to be aware
that a technical perspective is only one way of looking
at the world, and starting to recognize its core underlying
assumptions—and reject them.

3

The Technical Perspective

One piece of Agre’s argument is about the importance
of taking AI seriously:
“The central practice of the field of AI, and its central
value, was technical formalization. Inasmuch as they
regarded technical formalization as the most scientific
and the most productive of all known intellectual
methods, the field’s most prominent members tended to
treat their research as the heir of virtually the whole of
intellectual history. I have often heard AI people portray
philosophy, for example, as a failed project, and describe
the social sciences as intellectually sterile. In each case
their diagnosis is the same: lacking the precise and
expressive methods of AI, these fields are inherently
imprecise, woolly, and vague. Any attempt at a critical
engagement with AI should begin with an
appreciation of the experiences that have made these
extreme views seem so compelling.”
The target of Agre’s critique (and the focus of the first
half of his essay) is the AI that existed in the 1980s and
1990s, a very specific and peculiar field (seeing itself as
seeking to understanding mechanisms of cognition, in
contrast to the machine learning of today which is
instrumentally focused on achieving specific tasks and
effectively unconcerned with cognition; see Ref. [9]).
But the same logic remains: we begin a critical
engagement with an appreciation of the experiences that
make extreme technical views seem so compelling.
The specific “technical perspective” we refer to here
is a position around computation and digital
technology and has been identified and critiqued
under a series of related terms: Morozov’s “tech
solutionism”[10]; Toyama’s “tech commandments”[11];
Broussard’s “tech chauvinism”[12]; and Green’s “tech
goggles”[13]. These labels emphasize something about
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the arrogance and absolutism of the technical
perspective, and all authors emphasize how adherents
are dazzled by the apparent ability of technology (or, if
engaging more with the intellectual content than the
material artifacts, being dazzled by the apparent power
of formalizing goals, operations, and human concepts
into mathematical and/or software abstractions) to
control and change the world.
As we noted above, at their purest, technical
perspectives fall purely within the “positivism” column.
We first review the overall appeal of positivism, before
focusing specifically on its tech solutionist variety.
A statement by physicists Jean Bricmont and Alan
Sokal[14] provides a pure expression:
“In the same way that nearly everyone in his or her
everyday life disregards solipsism and radical
skepticism and spontaneously adopts a ‘realist’ or
‘objectivist’ attitude toward the external world,
scientists spontaneously do likewise in their professional
work. Indeed, scientists rarely use the word ‘realist,’
because it is taken for granted: of course they want to
discover (some aspects of) how the world really is! And
of course they adhere to the so-called correspondence
theory of truth (again, a word that is barely used): if
someone says that it is true that a given disease is caused
by a given virus, she means that, in actual fact, the
disease is caused by the virus.
“We would not even call it a ‘theory’; rather, we
consider it a precondition for the intelligibility of
assertions about the world.”
This captures something about the aesthetic appeal of
positivism and specifically its realist ontology: the world
is fundamentally knowable. Furthermore, the technical
person experiences the satisfaction of having command
of the sole means by which to achieve that knowledge.
While, as suggested in this quote, this perspective is
widespread in the natural, mathematical, or “hard”
sciences, “positivism” was actually coined as an
aspiration for social science in the 19th century (see
Appendix). Past that period, Porter[15] describes
post-WWII behavioralists adopting quantitative
methodologies in social science in pursuit of “liberating
essence of a proper objective methodology” that could
“rise above stubborn tradition and invisible culture”
(emphasis added). That is, they pursued a vision where
it is possible to know how the social world “really is”,
such that it is possible to have intelligible assertions
about it (rather than “stubborn tradition and invisible
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culture” getting in the way of intelligibility).
This idea of liberation through science leads to a view
where quantification and formalization are not only
practically superior, but morally superior as well.
Everything else in the world is anecdotal evidence, naïve
heuristics, and armchair philosophy—shackles of
ignorance either useless for accomplishing concrete
goals and characterized only by failure, or achieving
success only through sheer luck or cheap trickery. That
is, even if there is a case where technical approaches are
not practically superior (like, for example, convincing
climate change deniers), there is a view that they are
morally superior: even if attempting to understand or
intervene in the world through means other than
abstraction (i.e., through means like through rhetoric, or
narrative) may succeed, those alternatives are dishonest,
unprincipled, or otherwise somehow ignoble and
compromise our moral integrity.
In addition to this intrinsic moral superiority,
positivism seems to comport well with a basis for
morality. An observer-independent external world also
justifies universal morality—a standard which we can
hope to define, and then appeal to for solving moral
questions. Indeed, in the so-called “science wars” of the
1990s, when some scientists (initially led by Alan Sokal)
took up arms against what they saw as the “fashionable
nonsense” of science and technology studies (and related
areas), those scientists also bemoaned that while they
and the “postmodernists” seemed to share progressive
political goals of greater justice and equity, the
postmodern perspective was undermining the basis for
pursuing that goal and the basis of forming coalitions.
Even worse than getting in the way, “postmodern”
arguments are in fact deployed in support of[16, 17] and
by climate change deniers, creationists, and all sorts of
religious nationalists and right-wing movements across
the world. These reactionary elements of society seek to
undermine the legitimacy of science in pursuit of a
regressive political agenda, and while they clearly
believe in a single reality (corresponding to their own
beliefs), they co-opt language around plurality and
relativism to prevent critique. One of the more forceful
arguments around this is by Nanda[18], who argues how
Enlightenment beliefs in universality are what we need
to defend against perspectives like those of Hindu
nationalists, whose weaponization of science studies she
documents.
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The computation- and technology-focused variety of
positivism discussed by Morozov[10], Toyama[11],
Broussard[12], and Green[13] is not necessarily about
understanding the world, but about acting within it.
Toyama discusses (before undergoing what seems like
an awakening) thinking technology addresses “real
problems”; that both means that the problems are prior
to and independent of the perspective of the
technologists, and that technology in itself can actually
address and solve those problems. Morozov lists
examples of Silicon Valley rhetoric about technology
changing the world and solving global problems. He
summarized the implicit technologist vision of the future
in a satirical prediction:
“If Silicon Valley had a designated futurist, her bright
vision of the near future... would go something like this:
Humanity, equipped with powerful self-tracking devices,
finally conquers obesity, insomnia, and global warming
as everyone eats less, sleeps better, and emits more
appropriately. The fallibility of human memory is
conquered too, as the very same tracking devices record
and store everything we do. Car keys, faces, factoids:
We will never forget them again...
“Politics, finally under the constant and far-reaching
gaze of the electorate, is freed from all the sleazy
corruption, backroom deals, and inefficient horse
trading. Parties are disaggregated and replaced by
Groupon-like political campaigns, where users come
together—once—to weigh in on issues of direct and
immediate relevance to their lives, only to disband
shortly afterward. Now that every word—nay, sound—
ever uttered by politicians is recorded and stored for
posterity, hypocrisy has become obsolete as well.
Lobbyists of all stripes have gone extinct as the wealth
of data about politicians—their schedules, lunch menus,
travel expenses—are posted online for everyone to
review...
“Crime is a distant memory, while courts are
overstaffed and underworked. Both physical and virtual
environments—walls, pavements, doors, and log-in
screens—have become ‘smart.’ That is, they have
integrated the plethora of data generated by the
self-tracking devices and social-networking services so
that now they can predict and prevent criminal behavior
simply by analyzing their users. And as users don’t even
have the chance to commit crimes, prisons are no longer
needed either. A triumph of humanism, courtesy of
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Silicon Valley.”
This is a synthetic caricature, but we can use it to
discuss what might be compelling in the perspective that
Morozov identifies and critiques. There is a view that
technology is practically superior, in that it will succeed
where stubborn tradition and invisible culture have
failed. But also, tradition and culture are the cause of
social problems in the first place; technology is not
compromised by their failings, and thus to approach
social problems with technology rather than society is a
morally superior and more responsible move.
There is an ignominious aspect of the appeal of this
technical perspective as well, which Broussard shows.
She argues that technologists, who are frequently white,
male, and upper-class, fixate on technology as a way to
try and solve social problems traditionally managed by
people who are Black, women, and/or poor. These men
seek to use technology to avoid engaging with the
complex and messy labor and understandings these
groups have mobilized to manage and address social
problems. That is, part of the appeal to the technical
perspective is a chauvinistic one: of providing a means
to distance oneself from the knowledge, labor, and even
existence of devalued people who are women and/or
non-white. If we just invent the right device,
formalization, or processes, the thinking goes, we can
avoid needing to deal with all the ambiguities, nuances,
and emotional labor with which, say, Black women
social workers engage.
These are the appeals of a technical perspective. What,
then, leads people away from it? In awakenings, a
common theme seems to be a precipitating event or
moment that put the sleeper into a moment of crisis. For
Agre, what he described is fairly abstract and intellectual:
when trying to decide on a dissertation topic, he found
that “Every topic I investigated seemed driven by its own
powerful internal logic into a small number of technical
solutions, each of which had already been investigated
in the literature”. In his description, it was his search for
a novel topic led him to read the literatures of other
disciplines.
Agre does allude to a “large and diverse set of
historical conditions” beyond what he presents in the
essay. But as he does not elaborate on this, we turn to two
other examples of described awakenings, respectively
from Kentaro Toyama and Phil Rogaway.
First, we consider Kentaro Toyama, who rejected a
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technical perspective in a rather “scientific” way. In his
book Geek Heresy: Rescuing Social Change from the
Cult of Technology[11], he describes working after his
PhD on “ICT4D”-type projects (Information and
Communication Technologies for Development) for
Microsoft in India. His position involved expanding
technology
products’
audiences
beyond
the
educationally advantaged Indian middle class to try and
help those in poverty. But he repeatedly found his
attempted interventions failing.
“In the course of five years, I oversaw at least ten
different technology-for-education projects. We
explored video-recorded lessons by master teachers;
presentation tools that minimized prep time; learning
games customizable through simple text editing;
inexpensive clickers to poll and track student
understanding; software to convert PowerPoint slides
into discs for commonly available DVD players; split
screens to allow students to work side by side; and on and
on. Each time, we thought we were addressing a real
problem. But while the designs varied, in the end it didn’t
matter—technology never made up for a lack of good
teachers or good principals. Indifferent administrators
didn’t suddenly care more because their schools gained
clever gadgets; undertrained teachers didn’t improve
just because they could use digital content; and school
budgets didn’t expand no matter how many ‘cost-saving’
machines the schools purchased. If anything, these
problems were exacerbated by the technology, which
brought its own burdens.
“These revelations were hard to take. I was a computer
scientist, a Microsoft employee, and the head of a group
that aimed to find digital solutions for the developing
world. I wanted nothing more than to see innovation
triumph, just as it always did in the engineering papers
I was immersed in. But exactly where the need was
greatest, technology seemed unable to make a difference.”
This was “scientific” in the sense that Toyama was
open to evidence by which he tested his assumption that
technical tools can circumvent the messiness of society.
But the fact that he was even able to recognize that he had
such foundational assumptions is not a given; Toyama
contrasts his insights to the perspective of a prominent
technologist, One Laptop Per Child founder Nicholas
Negroponte:
“I was once on a panel at MIT with Negroponte where
I outlined my hard-won lessons about technology for
education. He didn’t like what I said, and he went on the
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offensive. But he did it with such confidence and selfassurance that, as I listened, I felt myself wanting to be
persuaded: Children are naturally curious, aren’t they?
Why wouldn’t they teach themselves on a nice, friendly
laptop?
“As I heard more of the technology hype, however, I
realized that it didn’t engage with rigorous evidence. It
was empty sloganeering that collapsed under critical
thinking.”
That is, many scientists and technologists are not, in
this sense, open to a particular type of empirical evidence.
This is not inherently bad or even “unscientific”—work
in the history, sociology, and philosophy of science
points out that interpretations of empirical evidence
require layers of theories and assumptions[19], including
the idea that evidence can be erroneous due to human
error, issues with instrumentation, or natural variability.
Indeed, skepticism of evidence that challenges
established theory is an important part of science: but
this is all to say, evidence alone is not enough to change
minds, such as in an awakening. Kuhn[20] famously
theorized that one-off failures in experimental science
seldom affect theory, but strings of failures can
precipitate a crisis, potentially leading to a paradigm
shift in understanding and defining basic scientific
concepts differently (and, conversely, it takes a crisis and
not simply routine failures to produce a paradigm
shift).
Second, we look at the account of cryptographer Phil
Rogaway in his essay, “The Moral Character of
Cryptographic Work”[21]. For Rogaway as well, there
was a discrete empirical event that led to his identifying
and rethinking some fundamental assumptions, but here
the challenge posed was a moral one rather than one of
assumptions about how the world works not fitting
evidence.
“Most academic cryptographers seem to think that our
field is a fun, deep, and politically neutral game—a set
of puzzles involving communicating parties and
notional adversaries. This vision of who we are animates
a field whose work is intellectually impressive and
rapidly produced, but also quite inbred and divorced
from real-world concerns. Is this what cryptography
should be like? Is it how we should expend the bulk of
our intellectual capital?
“For me, these questions came to a head with the
Snowden disclosures of 2013. If cryptography’s most
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basic aim is to enable secure communications, how
could it not be a colossal failure of our field when
ordinary people lack even a modicum of communication
privacy when interacting electronically? Yet I soon
realized that most cryptographers didn’t see it this way.
Most seemed to feel that the disclosures didn’t even
implicate us cryptographers.”
Also noteworthy is how both Rogaway and Toyama
(and Agre as well) describe resistance from their peers
to their crisis of faith, and how the experience that led to
their transformation did not succeed in triggering others.
This contrast again emphasizes that evidence, or external
triggers, are not sufficient to cause an awakening; they
are only catalysts for already-existing potential.
These accounts do not reflect on what made their
authors different from their peers. But understanding
these accounts through the lens of adult education and
specifically work on critical consciousness (see
Appendix), below, will help fill in key answers.
We can also contrast these descriptions to others who,
while recognizing the limitations of purely technical
approaches, remain within a positivist paradigm (or, at
most, soften to a post-positivist one).
Physicist and applied mathematician turned
sociologist Duncan Watts[22] wrote that “many of the
ideas and metrics of the ‘new’ science of networks have
either been borrowed from, or else rediscovered
independently of, a distinguished lineage of work in
mathematics,
economics,
and
sociology”,
acknowledging sociological contributions but reading
them in an essentially positivist light. Another person
trained in physics and working in network science, César
Hidalgo[23], wrote about realizing why “social and
natural scientists fail to see eye to eye”: “Social scientists
focus on explaining how context specific social and
economic mechanisms drive the structure of networks
and on how networks shape social and economic
outcomes. By contrast, natural scientists focus primarily
on modeling network characteristics that are
independent of context, since their focus is to identify
universal characteristics of systems instead of context
specific mechanisms”. This again positions social
science’s role by reference to the task of finding
universal and objective truths, rather than understanding
that (at least some) social science rejects the idea that
there could be universal characteristics.
A more personal potential example is Hannah
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Wallach’s viewpoint, “Computational Social Science ,
Computer Science + Social Data”[24]. In this she writes,
“Despite all the hype, machine learning is not a be-all
and end-all solution. We still need social scientists if we
are going to use machine learning to study social
phenomena in a responsible and ethical manner.” A
dilemma was only hinted at:
“When I first started working in computational social
science, I kept overhearing conversations between
computer scientists and social scientists that involved
sentences like, ‘I don’t get it—how is that even research?’
And I could not understand why. But then I found this
quote by Gary King and Dan Hopkins—two political
scientists—that, I think, really captures the heart of this
disconnect: ‘computer scientists may be interested in
finding the needle in the haystack—such as... the right
Web page to display from a search—but social scientists
are more commonly interested in characterizing the
haystack.’
“In other words, the conversations I kept overhearing
were occurring because the goals typically pursued by
computer scientists and social scientists fall into two
very different categories... models for prediction are
often intended to replace human interpretation or
reasoning, whereas models for explanation are intended
to inform or guide human reasoning.”
But what she describes overall only goes so far as to
recognize the importance of quantitative social
science—areas of economics like econometrics and
game theory, and political science, all of which build
formal models for the task of causal understanding.
There is no mention of “thick” disciplines that do not use
quantitative modeling, such as cultural anthropology,
critical sociology, critical race studies, human
geography, critical gender studies, media studies, or
cultural studies, let alone any mention of experiential
ways of knowing outside of academic disciplines.
Like with Agre, from this piece alone it is impossible
to know if this encapsulates Wallach’s understandings,
or if it is rhetorical strategy (indeed, in a later piece,
Wallach[25] seems to go beyond post-positivism in
recognizing that the notions of “objectivity” are both
ill-defined and not desirable, as well as acknowledging
positionality② [see Appendix]). After all, it is much
② “Will these changes of always having a sociotechnical lens make
machine learning less fun? Maybe, for some people. But that is their
privilege talking about their ethical debt. Machine learning has never
been all that fun for people who are involuntarily represented in datasets
or subject to uncontestable life-altering decisions made by machine
learning systems.”
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easier to convince computer scientists of the value of the
formalism- and data-heavy discipline of economics than
of interpretive disciplines like cultural studies, or of
knowledge that comes from lived experience.

4

Critical Awakenings

Earlier, we mentioned Kuhn’s idea of paradigm shifts.
Recognizing that this may be too simple a model for
scientific development[26], Mezirow[27, 28] offers a
similar model but instead describing individual
psychosocial development, which he called perspective
transformation. More immediately, Mezirow’s idea
comes from the work of Paulo Freire and his idea of
critical consciousness (see Appendix), and has a robust
body of follow-up work investigating the idea
empirically[29] and developing it theoretically[30−32]. We
will also draw on subsequent work that has noted
shortcomings in Mezirow’s theory not going far enough
in considering context, other cultural settings, and the
significance of interpersonal relationships[32].
Perspective transformation came from Mezirow’s
study with women who re-entered college programs
mid-life. He identified the ultimate value of such
programs as being in the personal transformation that
took place among the women, rather than any material
outcomes. He theorized 10 stages of this process:
“(1) A disorienting dilemma;
“(2) Self-examination with feelings of fear, anger,
guilt, or shame;
“(3) A critical assessment of assumptions and a sense
of alienation from taken-for-granted social roles and
expectations;
“(4) Recognition that one’s discontent and the process
of transformation are shared and that others have
negotiated a similar change;
“(5) Exploration of options for new roles,
relationships, and actions;
“(6) Planning a course of action;
“(7) Acquiring knowledge and skills for implementing
one’s plans;
“(8) Provisional trying of new roles;
“(9) Building competence and self-confidence in new
roles and relationships;
“(10) A reintegration into one’s life on the basis of
conditions dictated by one’s new perspective.”
These ten stages are somewhere between descriptive
and normative. They are descriptive, insofar as they
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describe a process undergone by the subjects of
Mezirow’s study, but normative, insofar as Mezirow
identified perspective transformation as something
valuable and possibly aided by knowing about this
sequence in advance and following it (following Freire,
and the idea of critical consciousness as a normative
goal). While this alone does not necessarily shed light on
who would experience a dilemma as disorienting and
change in response (since Mezirow encountered women
already pursuing a change), it does point to how this
change does not happen in isolation, and indeed how
connecting with others who have negotiated a similar
change is key for shaping awakenings towards
productive ends. But Mezirow[33] does provide an
answer for the question of what is needed beyond
evidence, observing that an additional condition is that
a person reflect about assumptions and beliefs that
structured how they understood an experience (or
evidence).
Also noteworthy are the examples of disorienting
dilemmas: they included “the death of a husband, a
divorce, the loss of a job, a change of city of residence,
retirement, an empty nest, a remarriage, the near fatal
accident of an only child, or jealousy of a friend who had
launched a new career successfully”. In comparison, the
dilemmas of Agre, Toyama, and Rogaway are decidedly
elite and privileged experiences. Still, we can identify
critical technical awakenings as a specific form of a
much more general phenomenon of critical
consciousness, thus making it appropriate to theorize
with perspective transformation.
There are several lessons to draw from this connection.
The first is how critical technical awakenings may relate
to critical consciousness (CC) overall. Jemal[34] notes
that much work on critical consciousness has
deliberately excluded privileged populations, but argues
this exclusion “...may inadvertently support the
proposition that oppression is a problem for the
oppressed to solve. When, in essence, CC is important
for members of privileged groups who have greater
access to resources and power and can operate as allies
privileged by the system of social injustice, unfair
distribution of resources and opportunities, and inequity,
be able to recognize unjust social processes and acquire
the knowledge and skills needed for social change.”
Drawing from Freire, she continues：
“It is imperative that those who may be privileged by
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the system of social injustice, unfair distribution of
resources and opportunities, and inequity, be able to
recognize unjust social processes and acquire the
knowledge and skills needed for social change... CC
would help individuals understand their role in a system
of oppression, as members of either the privileged or
stigmatized groups. Liberation requires true solidarity in
which the oppressor not only fights at the side of the
oppressed, but also takes a radical posture of empathy by
‘entering into the situation of those with whom one is
solidary’.[35] Thus, CC, with the goal of liberation, has
the radical requirement that the oppressor, those who
deny others the right to speak their word, and the
oppressed, those whose right to speak has been denied,
must collaborate to transform the structures that beget
oppression.[35]”
The second is that all of the descriptions of possible
critical technical awakenings do not recognize “that one’s
discontent and the process of transformation are shared
and that others have negotiated a similar change”. From
the perspective of Mezirow’s theory, this means they fall
short. Indeed, our article here is an attempt to directly
address the fragmentary nature of narratives of critical
technical awakenings, and to draw connections between
people’s experiences. We can also continue the
normative route, and note that in order to fully achieve
the potential for social change from critical technical
awakenings, we should try to see how to continue past
stage (5) and on to stages (6)−(10).
What might new roles (stages (5)−(9)) be, in which
technical practitioners should build competence and
self-confidence, and make provisional efforts? We
suggest that one role might be in opposing gatekeeping.
It is rare even for qualitative researchers to have a seat
at the table of technological adoption, let alone
communities affected by it. But by leveraging the social
standing that comes with quantitative legitimacy, and
translating concerns into terms that are (more)
acceptable for technical audiences as a first step,
technical practitioners can help bring others into the
processes of technology development—whether to
participate, or to oppose development and deployment
that does not empower those communities.
The relationships that come with those roles would be
with allies outside of technical disciplines and sectors,
and particularly through learning from and working with
communities affected by technology (whether directly,
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by a technology itself, or indirectly, such as in
gentrification resulting from real estate expansions by
the tech industry or of universities who receive influxes
of tech money). These would be new roles not only for
the technical practitioners, but indeed new social roles,
and would require weathering all the difficulties of
negotiating roles outside of recognized categories.
Drawing on the follow-up work to Mezirow, we also
draw attention to the importance of looking at
perspective transformations outside of frames of
self-realization[31], and indeed outside of depicting the
process as a deeply rational one in molds of western
rationality. One example is a study that identifies
disorienting dilemmas among women in Botswana that
led to questioning assumptions, but with the value of the
outcome being oriented towards the spiritual,
community responsibility and relationships, and gender
roles[36]. Indeed, acknowledging other ways of knowing
that are not expressed in the language of rationality
makes perspective transformation far less novel.
Johnson-Bailey[37], coming from the perspective of a
Black woman, writes about “transformational learning
as the only medium in which we exist, learn, and teach.
Since it is the air we breathe, maybe we just take it for
granted and didn’t attend to or claim it sufficiently.” This
is also an example of a more general issue; in “The Race
for Theory”, Barbara Christian[38] wrote, “people of
color have always theorized—but in forms quite
different from the Western form of abstract logic... our
theorizing is often in narrative forms, in the stories we
create, in riddles and proverb, in the play with language,
since dynamic rather than fixed ideas seem more to our
liking. How else have we managed to survive with such
spiritedness the assault on our bodies, social institutions,
countries our very humanity? ...My folk, in other words,
have always been a race for theory”.
The third is in looking at recommendations from adult
education about how we might encourage perspective
transformations. Unfortunately, as Taylor and Snyder[32]
note, work has focused on support based around
assumptions from Mezirow, “such as creating a safe and
inclusive learning environment, focusing on the
individual learner’s needs, and building on life
experiences”. One strand of work that does go beyond
Mezirow’s assumptions looks at how the significance of
spontaneous action depends on social recognition. That
work finds that what would otherwise be a spontaneous
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action becomes personally meaningful when others
point it out and provide positive feedback about it.
Combining these strands together, we can say: those
who have undergone a critical technical awakening
should think about relationships with others in which we
create safe and inclusive learning environments,
facilitate opportunities for experience, serve as guides
who can give focus to specific learning needs, and give
positive feedback around disorienting dilemmas and
other opportunities for reflecting and questioning
assumptions.
While these principles were developed in opposition
to existing formalized education, there may be
opportunities to incorporate them into formal education
as well. Trbušić[39] argues for integrating critical
methods into engineering education as a way of making
ethics more than a superficial part of training. She
specifically suggests using Augusto Boal’s technique of
Theatre of the Oppressed[40] (itself based on the work of
Freire, with whom Boal was friends), using
improvisation and role-playing to encourage critical
consciousness. Incorporating role-playing with
scenarios where engineering students are put into ethical
dilemmas could encourage taking an active stance,
trying different roles, and stimulating reflection in a way
that presenting formal models of ethics would not.
Especially insofar as critical technical awakenings
may fall short more than other types of critical
consciousness, there is also a task for how to deepen our
own awareness and practice. Taylor and Snyder[32]
identify work about “social accountability”, where a
moral underpinning is an outcome of transformative
learning. More specifically, “the outcome of
transformative learning involves recognizing the
reasons why, for what purpose, and for whom a new
identity was constructed”, especially as an essential
component of trusting relationships[41]. Having
transformations be ethically grounded for what kind of
world we want to see and work towards, and making this
a focus of interpersonal relationships and communitybuilding, can also help achieve more complete and
powerful transformations.

5

Ethics

Earlier, we raised reasons why it seems like positivism
is compelling as a basis for ethics. But Rogaway and
Toyama’s accounts, in particular, get at how positivism
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and technical disciplines are harmful in the
consequences of their epistemological assumptions: if
quantitative forms of knowledge are superior, then other
forms of knowledge are inferior. Consequently, those
who do not hold quantitative knowledge do not have
anything to offer.
De Sousa Santos[42, 43] discusses the interconnection
of ecologies of knowledge and how people are valued.
When knowledge is put in hierarchies, it also places
people into hierarchies. Sylvia Wynter, in her landmark
work on “No Humans Involved”[44], has a stark
presentation of this idea. Her title refers to a term used
by the Los Angeles Police Department to classify police
encounters where they enacted violence on young Black
men who were jobless in the inner city: by saying that
these encounters did not involved “humans”, the
department excused themselves from documenting their
use of force and gave them a license to continue. The
literal, administrative category reflected metaphorical
dehumanization: there is no brutality or injustice if the
targets are not human.
Critical, constructivist, and participatory paradigms
link epistemology and axiology, saying: how do we
value people, if we do not value their knowledge? Even
post-positivism is insufficient; we can see calls for
“Human-Centered AI”, or “Human-Centered Machine
Learning”, or “Human-Centered Data Science” as fitting
into a post-positivist frame, where we pursue objective
knowledge and “real” technology that is focused around
the figure of the human and its subjectivity. But humancenteredness does not address dehumanization, who gets
recognition as being in the category of “human”, and
how exclusion happens (e.g., being “human” is reserved
for people who look, talk, think, act, and exist in certain
ways). Any form of human-centered computing that
takes the category of “human” for granted will not undo
the status quo of what Wynter calls “narrative
condemnation”. Participatory approaches, in particular,
start with the proposition that everyone is valuable, and
then derive knowledge from there.
As in the premise of critical theory, the Enlightenment
led to or at least did not prevent the atrocities of the
Holocaust, to which we can also add the atrocities of
indigenous genocides in the Americas and Australia, the
brutality of colonialism like in the anthropogenic Bengal
famine or the atrocities in Congo Free State, and
especially the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Science was a
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weapon to dehumanize and make exclusionary standards
for moral standing throughout history[45]. It was utilized
as a tool to control otherized populations, alienate them
from the public sphere, and remove them from societal
participation. Pretending these things did not happen, or
pretending as though they were aberrations from the
natural course of science, does nothing to prevent them
from happening in the future. Atrocity and oppression
cannot happen without devaluing entire groups of people,
and excluding them from belonging to the same sort of
category of being; this is the only way we can apply
different standards, for example, of surveillance or
accountability or resource distribution or violence to
people based on different labels (e.g., criminal,
immigrant, welfare beneficiary, and foreign citizen).
Then, instead of making universal morality the basis of
our ethics, we should seek to dismantle knowledge
hierarchies. We should valorize knowledge creation that
resisted and persisted through dehumanization[46]
through empirical but also artistic, narrative, and cultural
means, and see these as no lesser than quantitative forms
of knowledge.
We advocate specifically for the ethics of care from
Black feminist frameworks[47−50]. Traditionally,
descriptive ethics have linked recognition, belonging,
and moral standing: normatively, the way to be ethical,
and achieve justice, is to extend recognition, equal
standing, and the protection of rights to people who have
been marginalized and excluded (such as by bringing
marginalized people into full participation in the public
sphere, or by policies framed around safeguarding
human or civil rights). In contrast, the ethics of care is
a normative ethical position that reacts to the ethics of
recognition and how it descriptively concedes to
“recognition” as being an acceptable basis for treatment.
This ethical position is found in a long history of the
labor of Black women (including potentially not under
the explicit label of “ethics of care”[51]), specifically in
Black feminist circles and in value-based social services
disciplines[52] like social work, thinking about how to
have ethical and holistic interpersonal relationships, and
focusing on care for marginalized people[53−55]. Instead
of recognition, the basis of these ethics is empathy, love,
and connection, coming from non-Eurocentric
world-views, and advocating treating every living being
with care. Scaling up interpersonal care to systems
creates a principle that systems must serve the most
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marginalized and disadvantaged, rather than those
people needing to fit into systems or gain social capital
before they are respected or considered important.

6

Traps

A critical technical awakening destabilizes a positivist
worldview, opening up the possibility of a perspective
transformation that leads to people working with
deliberation and awareness towards a better world. But
it is not sufficient. In a reflection of the language of
Selbst et al.[56] who talk about five “traps” of the
(positivist) formalisms of computer science, we discuss
two traps in critical technical awakenings that reject
positivism but may fail to achieve genuine
transformation. There are other traps as well, for
example co-option, as discussed in other articles in this
special issue[2, 3], but here we discuss incomplete
awakenings, and technical abandonment.
The first and most important trap is of incomplete
awakenings, where one’s perspective only widens
somewhat, and specifically does not get past knowledge
hierarchies. We have sketched out a particular normative
path for an awakening, with this dismantlement as the
goal. But none of the critical technical awakenings we
identify necessarily get this far. Agre’s characterization
of his awakening, for example, seemed more like it was
about intellectual fulfillment, and (at least from the
description) did not engage with positionality. What he
describes is coming to see some other forms of elite
knowledge, namely those from the humanities and social
sciences, as superior to his former narrow technical
worldview.
The blindness Broussard[12] identifies of technologists
to other forms of knowledge from experience is not ever
recognized or addressed in Agre’s work. Again, the work
may not reflect the full extent of Agre’s experience, and
it may do so in a particular rhetorical strategy of not
trying to overturn positivism and knowledge hierarchies
all at once; but, this is a theme across the other
descriptions of awakenings as well. In none of them is
there a recognition of the existence and value of other
very different forms of knowledge, or the value of the
people who hold those other forms of knowledge.
The second trap is a more subjective one: that of
abandonment. There is a temptation, upon having an
awakening and becoming disillusioned, to abandon
technical work entirely. We argue this is bad for two
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reasons. The first is a strategic one: at the risk of reifying
quantification and technology, we believe that there is
a role for those trained in these methods to push back and
develop critiques in “internal” terms that can be
intelligible to those still in a technical mindset (and
perhaps even leading others to having their own critical
technical awakening). These are some of the potential
“new roles”, as in Mezirow’s ten steps, we explore above.
This temptation is parallel to how, upon recognizing and
becoming disillusioned with privilege, one temptation is
to attempt to reject that privilege; but, such attempts do
not actually erase the privilege one has benefitted from
in the past. Finding ways to engage with and leverage
this privilege is the more responsible course.
The second reason we argue against abandonment is
more abstract and speculative. Just as modern qualitative
research originated in the oppressive project of colonial
anthropology but has since worked to reform on grounds
of being reflexive and pursuing justice, so too might
quantitative research move away from positivism[57].
Given that quantification is about abstraction[56], and
abstraction flattens meanings[15], it is difficult to imagine
quantitative knowledge that can be reflexive and
acknowledge other forms of knowledge, but is worth
exploring. Agre’s own suggestion of a “critical technical
practice” is itself a call to continue creating technical
knowledge, but through a critical lens. What that might
mean or how it might look is unclear from Agre’s work
or the handful of subsequent works that have taken on
that label, but the development of technical knowledge
on something other than a realist ontology and a
hierarchical axiology can be seen as a worthwhile
challenge.

7

The Path Forward

Despite being a powerful expression of a profound
shared experience, Agre’s call for “critical technical
practice” has largely languished for the past two decades.
For personal reasons, Agre himself has not been active
in academia[58] to continue exploring and developing
this idea himself. Critical technical practice has been
continued by a few people, like Phoebe Sengers[59], but
even that has been mostly within design and HumanComputer Interaction[60, 61], rather than in more formal
mathematic and technical areas where critical and
constructivist approaches are most alien.
As discussed before, one key missing element from
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Agre’s narrative and those of others is Mezirow’s
stage (4), “Recognition that one’s discontent and process
of transformation are shared and that others have
negotiated a similar chang.” While it is hard to say why
critical technical practice failed to take hold—Agre no
longer being active in academia? The original essay not
having any clear statement of what, exactly, critical
technical practice is or looks like? Critical technical
practice not being a good way to productively channel
awakenings? There not being enough awakenings to
form a critical mass? Agre simply being ahead of his
time[62]?—building community and coalitions seems to
be a critical missing step.
Some of what we detail in sources of awakening
suggest ways that we can try to encourage more people
with a technical perspective to undergo critical
awakenings: exposure to anti-positivist and anti-realist
ideas, putting them in contact with non-technical
individuals,
and
finding
ways
to
attack
compartmentalization (as is done in other articles in this
collection like those of Green[8], and in the design
method that Stark[63] offers). Or, if these were integrated
in technical education sufficiently early on[25, 39],
perhaps people would never develop a distinctly
technical perspective and would not need (as abrupt of)
an awakening, in a topic that also relates to the article in
this special issue by Korn[64]. This article (as well as that
of Hu[3]) also partially take the form of personal
reflections, which are central in critical awakenings;
while we have chosen, primarily for reasons of length
and coherence, to make this essay a primarily
informational and analytic one rather than discuss our
experiences, we cite these articles as examples of how
we should seek to create more opportunities for technical
practitioners to, respectively, engage in their own
personal reflections as a technical practitioner[3] and
with the experiences of others[64].
Seeking out perspectives from others, both
contemporary and historical, is one way to break through
ossified visions. In “Informatics of the Oppressed”,
Ochigame describes in English for the first time two
Latin American informatics projects[65]. First, Cuban
librarians and computer scientists in the 1980s, facing
US embargoes, set up an alternative information
indexing and retrieval system whose mathematical
model, among other features, adjusted readership-based
indexes by the number of librarians in recognition of the
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“author-reader social communication that happens in
libraries”. Second, liberation theologists in Brazil
resisting the post-1964 military dictatorship set up a print
and mail-based “intercommunication network” to solicit
and internationally distribute writings by those most
subjected to domination, in a vision of advancing Freire’s
project past a need for intermediaries and towards
“‘inter-conscientization’ between the oppressed”.
Ochigame notes that these projects were, like libertarian
fantasies coming out of California, overly optimistic in
what technology (alone) would achieve; but these
visions were still valuable in the alternative they offered
to ranking based only on productivity or popularity (in
Cuba), and in justifying and structuring dissemination
not just in terms of free speech or in the politics of
“whether one is free to speak, but whose voices one can
hear and which listeners one’s voice can reach” (in
Brazil). We can take inspiration from these alternative
visions, and seek out others that have similarly been
silenced and pushed aside (indeed, Ochigame’s
discovery of these projects came through personal
meetings, and not online searches). Those of us trained
in technology development and quantitative forms of
knowing should try to build on these, and explore
alternative visions. We hold that the potential value of
quantitative knowledge outside of its connection to and
role in upholding power, hierarchy, and privileged
access to truth have yet to be fully explored.
Another key part of any path forward is to build
community to encourage, support, and guide critical
technical awakenings, and channel those who undergo
such awakenings towards developing a critical
technical practice. Here, we can point to conference
workshops[60, 61, 63, 66], networks like the one formed
from the Ethical Tech Working Group that generated this
special issue, fellowship cohorts, and mentorship as
paths forward. But as a caveat, while communitybuilding aimed at reaching technical practitioners will
most likely need to operate within institutional elitism
(indeed, like the Ethical Tech Working Group being at
Harvard), this should only be one part of larger
community-building. After all, during his exile under
Brazil’s 21-year military dictatorship, Freire also spent
a year as a visiting professor at Harvard; but he
eventually returned to Brazil and continued to develop
both theory and practice, including serving as a
municipal Secretary of Education.
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But questions remain. What is the value of quantitative
approaches outside of knowledge hierarchies? As
Bricmont and Sokal suggest[14], are quantitative and
technical approaches to the world only valuable if they
are getting at a single universal truth? If we reject
positivism, and choose participatory paradigms and the
ethics of care, must we reject technical approaches? Or
even if not, how can we integrate the ethics of care into
technology to achieve “doing no unintended harm”, and
not
further
marginalizing
resource-deprived
communities? What sorts of technical practices might
emerge not from an elite critical stance, but from a
critical pedagogical stance?
It seems daunting, but qualitative research also was
once positivist and hierarchical, for example, in seeing
the role of a colonial anthropologist as providing neutral
description about colonized or imperialized peoples to
better facilitate control.
Lastly, we hope this article has served as an
orientation, encouragement, and guidance for those who
are undergoing the kind of vertigo that Agre described.
The technical variant of critical consciousness is a
profound and important experience, just like critical
consciousness in general. But if it happens in isolation,
it may be unnecessarily painful, and more importantly
may not overcome the most pernicious part of positivism:
creating and defending hierarchies of knowledge that
structure the ways we approach the world, value ideas,
and treat other beings. We hope that this article points to
how this experience is not isolated, and gives support
towards building community, overcoming knowledge
hierarchies, adopting an ethics of care, and taking action
towards more liberated ways of being.

Appendix
Glossary of Key Terms
Realism is the belief in a single underlying reality that
exists independent of and prior to human conception of
it. A specific form of this was articulated by Plato, where
mathematical forms are immutable and that invariance
what determines what is “real”. Confusingly but perhaps
more appropriately, this is sometimes also called
“idealism”, since reality is associated with ideas rather
than perception.
Positivism was coined by Auguste Comte in
philosophical writings around 1830−1842. It was an
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application of methodology from natural sciences to
study human behavior and social phenomena. Comte
articulated positivism[57] in terms of a premise that
universal truths exist for human behavior and social
phenomenon (i.e., a realist ontology), and that empirical
observations through scientific measurement can
discover these universal truths (i.e., an empiricist
epistemology and methodology).
Positivism now describes any research paradigm that
holds that a singular truth exists and can be uncovered
by empirical observation, and covers natural sciences as
well as social and behavioral sciences. There are
versions of positivism that try to avoid the realist
commitment, and there can also be realism without
empiricism (such as in pure mathematics) but the key
point of either realism or positivism as compared to other
sets of assumptions is belief in an external world that
takes primacy over actors’ interpretations and
renegotiations of it[67].
Post-positivism is a softening of positivism, and held
by people who still find positivism aesthetically
compelling, but acknowledge that contingent and
malleable (and non-scientifically measurable) history,
society, and culture can come in the way of our ability to
discover universal truths through observation, and so
must be accounted for (potentially through qualitative
means).
Critical theory is a type of philosophy often viewed
as originating from a specific group of European
intellectuals based in Frankfurt in the period between the
World Wars. Against the prevailing view that the
Enlightenment had led to constant social improvement,
this Frankfurt School and their successors sought to
theorize how the Enlightenment led to, or at least failed
to prevent, World War I, the rise of anti-Semitism, and
other forms of oppression (eventually leading to the
Holocaust) in liberal capitalist societies. Of course,
earlier major atrocities—such as the trans-Atlantic slave
trade, or colonial genocide of indigenous
populations—tellingly did not lead to similar
soul-searching among European intellectuals about the
consequences of the Enlightenment. Still, the Frankfurt
School represented when a major European
philosophical school caught up to people in the
colonized world in acknowledging marginalization as a
central philosophical question. For example, Rabaka[68]
argues that Martinique-born psychiatrist and
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philosopher Frantz Fanon (discussed more below), built
on prior work from the colonized world and went far
beyond the Frankfurt school in analyzing the nature of
the racism and exploitation of settler colonialism.
It is from the Frankfurt School’s use of “critical” that
the term is applied to theories that dispute prevailing
assumptions about social development needing only
continue along its current course to eventually result in
the end of forms of oppression, e.g., around gender, race,
sexuality, disability, etc.
A good definition of what makes a “critical social
science” is in Fay’s Critical Social Science: Liberation
and its Limits[69]. Fay conceives of critical social science
as a type of “estrangement theory”. This is a view of the
world that holds that there is a manifest/ordinary sphere
in which most people live, but this keeps them trapped
from what is best in life, which exists in a
hidden/extraordinary sphere. Specifically, critical social
science is a humanist variant of estrangement theory,
that locates the hidden/extraordinary sphere not in a
religious or spiritual plane (like religious and mystical
traditions do), but in the social plane. He additionally
theorizes that a complete critical theory includes a theory
of
false
consciousness
(identifying
certain
understandings and explaining how they are false and/or
incoherent, and how they come to be and are maintained),
a theory of crisis (how a society is in a crisis from felt
dissatisfactions that threaten social cohesion and cannot
be resolved within existing social organization and selfunderstandings), a theory of education (the necessary
and sufficient conditions for overcoming the false
consciousness), and a theory of transformative action
(identifying what needs to change, and a plan of action
for who are “carriers” of anticipated social change and
how they will go about achieving it).
Note that positivism (or realism) can have an
estrangement aspect as well, where there is a hidden truth
that reality is apprehensible through the language of
mathematics and/or experimental methods, leading to
liberation. Indeed, Plato’s parable of the cave, and
Platonism (as well as the neo-Platonism of mystic cults
throughout the Mediterranean and West Asia centuries
after Plato) sees universal abstract mathematical forms
as the truth from which the masses are estranged. But the
estrangement aspect of positivism need not be present,
whereas it is an essential part of any critical theory.
Relativism is a stance that potentially spans ontology,

379

epistemology, and axiology. Ontological (or conceptual)
relativism holds that there is no observer-independent
reality, and that an observer creates their own reality.
Epistemically, relativism holds that there is no neutral
frame in which we can arbitrate whether claims are “true”
or “false”. This can be understood empirically (rather
than normatively)③: for example, speaking purely
empirically, there is no frame of reference to which a
Biblical creationist and an evolutionary biologist would
agree for arbitrating their competing claims about the
origin of biological diversity. Each would insist on their
own frame being the “neutral” or superior one, and any
logical or empirical basis for deciding between the
frames would itself rely on agreement over what counts
as logical or empirical. Moral relativism holds that there
is no neutral frame in which we can decide what is good
or bad. Similar to epistemic relativism, moral relativism
may be a descriptive rather than a normative position,
built on the observation that people have genuine
disagreements about morality that cannot be logically
resolved by an appeal to universal underlying principles.
That is, a relativist can have their own (non-relativist)
normative morality that they believe is correct, alongside
a relativist ontology and/or relativist epistemology that
they also believe is correct, but they recognize that there
is not necessarily any deeper universal principle to which
to appeal and logically convince others. As a corollary,
we can account for people with perspectives we find
bizarre or moral codes that we find abhorrent who cannot
be convinced through logical means, rather than needing
to dismiss them as insane.
Relativism represents a break from a singular truth,
and can be deeply uncomfortable and threatening for
those accustomed to the pursuit of certainty and finality.
Worse, when every possible position and action can be
critiqued, relativized, destabilized, and once we know
how to do this, it can be debilitating. See below for how
participatory paradigms provide a way out of this.
Constructivism is built on relativism, and describes
③ Barnes and Bloor[70] have a relatively simple response to the frequent
initial objection that relativism is paradoxical or self-refuting (i.e., if all
perspectives are equally valid, then by its own admission relativism
concedes to non-relativism): relativism is not saying we cannot hold our
own perspective, or we cannot condemn those of others or say they are
wrong (whether morally, or in terms of knowledge); relativism can be just
the recognition that others can and will reject our views or condemnations,
and that our condemnations alone will not convince them otherwise. Of
course, it is possible to interpret relativism in such a way as to defend the
right of regressive perspectives to exist, but that treats relativism as a
standard to which to aspire, rather than a description of how things are.
And, relativism is self-referential and can create paradoxes, but we
believe that accepting these paradoxes as axiomatic is enormously
insightful.
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the process by which multiple “truths” come to exist. It
is an idea coming out of the sociology of knowledge that
holds that our experiences of the world, and knowledge,
are not references to or reflections of an underlying
external reality, but are the product of historical, cultural,
and material forces that, had they been different, would
have built something different. Note that saying
something (like scientific knowledge) is “constructed”
does not mean that it is not real, or not solid, or not robust;
a metaphor used to illustrate this perspective[71] is that
of a house, which is perfectly “real” but it came to exist
at a certain point in time, and was built in one specific
way out of specific materials out of many alternatives.
We can come to understand this building process without
claiming the building is anything other than solid and
durable. However, other versions of constructivism
stress the fluidity of things like scientific knowledge,
rejecting the idea of knowledge as hierarchical structures
anchored to, if not a solid underlying reality, then to
society and history; these versions of constructivism
instead see knowledge as ungrounded webs of mutual
reference. Then, the task of inquiry is to understand the
construction and maintenance of these webs of mutual
reference (with the inquiry being itself a part of the webs
it considers).
There is a tension between critical theory and
constructivism[72] in how critical perspectives can end
up holding that there is an external world, just that it is
something different than what most people think it is. So,
for example, Fay offers the Marxist-humanist model of
political revolution as an example of a critical theory,
where there is a “true nature” that bourgeoisie oppressors
derive power from the self-understandings of the
oppressed working classes.
However, they frequently appear together. Hacking[73]
points out how looking at how things are put together
also gives people grounds to see how they come apart,
and deconstruct them. A crucial part of a critical toolbox
is in showing the historical construction of ideas, forms
of knowledge, institutions, and cultural forms, thereby
demonstrating that they are not inevitable, and letting us
imagine and advocate for alternatives.
For example, in critical race studies and critical gender
studies, there is a “false consciousness” of thinking that
the categories by which people are marginalized are
based on biological traits or even cultural ones. But there
is no such thing as biological race or gender, let alone
inferiority by them (and the “value” of cultures, like
European culture versus indigenous cultures, come from
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how they are valued, and not something intrinsic).
Instead, such categories and their value are socially
constructed by and maintained through power
relationships. Going further, there is a second layer to the
false consciousness, of holding marginalized people
individually responsible for their suffering and
deprivation. Once categories are so constructed, those
that fall within the marginalized categories like women
of color and others with individual or intersecting
marginalized identities are treated as inferior, in ways
often enacted on an interpersonal level but structurally
and culturally encouraged and permitted. The result is
marginalized people face greater mental and physical
suffering, and material deprivation, entirely apart from
their individual “effort”, yet over which they are held
responsible. Even holding those who enact the double
standards individually responsible (i.e., seeing racism or
sexism as an interpersonal problem), rather than seeing
the larger structure, is a false consciousness. Only by
recognizing the true nature of modern civilization as
fundamentally structured on white supremacy,
patriarchy, colonialism, and other forms of domination
can we effect change and improve human life.
Indeed, Agre’s[74] idea of “critical” is actually more
about constructivism (and unfortunately he sets it up
using ableist language). In one entry from his Red Rock
Eater Newsletter (a listserv over which Agre sent out
writings that has been cited as a precedent for blogs), he
wrote:
“I finally comprehended the difference between
critical thinking and its opposite. Technical people are
not dumb [sic], quite the contrary, but technical curricula
rarely include critical thinking in the sense I have in mind.
Critical thinking means that you can, so to speak, see
your glasses. You can look at the world, or you can
back up and look at the framework of concepts and
assumptions and practices through which you look
at the world.”
Agre continues: “Not that critical thinking makes you
omniscient: you’re still wearing glasses even when
you’re looking at your glasses.” That is, there is no
perspective without any glasses, no “view from
nowhere”.④ The experience of “seeing one’s glasses” is
different than just replacing one’s glasses; it opens the
④ Ludwig Wittgenstein, another figure who underwent a transformation
in his basic beliefs and how he saw the world, also used this metaphor
much earlier[75]: “The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can
never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside;
outside you cannot breathe.—Where does this idea come from? It is like
a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at.
It never occurs to us to take them off.”
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path to understanding endless contingency in ideas,
structures, institutions, and frameworks.
Critical consciousness is a theory that came out of
political mobilization and community development, also
known as popular education, in the Global South[76−78],
and specifically from the work of Brazilian educator,
philosopher, and politician Paulo Freire (1921–1997).
Freire worked in the 1960s with populations like
marginalized sugarcane harvesters with no access to
formal education. He started education programs for
political mobilization in conjunction with them, and
used that mobilization to get the Brazilian government to
financially support the programs they had created. He
challenged a “banking” conception of education that
assumed he was more of a knowledge holder and
knowledge creator than the farmers he worked with, and
that placed more value on him as a teacher, because he
had access to formal education. He inverted the
hierarchy to say that the marginalized are valuable
because of their response to marginalization, their
resilience, and how the experience of marginalization
showed larger societal structures in a way that Freire,
with his privilege, had not seen. He theorized how to
unseat the teacher or researcher as the expert, and sought
to develop a model where we all bring something to the
table and learn from each other, and understanding
emerges from our interactions.
Another key input, on whose work Freire drew, was
Frantz Fanon (1925–1961). Fanon was hired as a
psychiatrist by the French colonial government in
Algeria to treat mental illness in colonial subjects. There,
Fanon realized that his patients were not having mental
health crises, but reacting to oppression, and the French
government did not understand that their reaction was
the most logical response to being otherized,
dehumanized, and oppressed. Building on his previous
work theorizing his own experience being treated as a
French colonial subject[79], in interacting with his
patients in Algeria he learned about his own position in
a larger oppressive system and how it was causing harm
to others[80, 81]. From this, he wrote about working with
marginalized populations, unlearning harmful frames,
and mobilizing for revolution and equity, himself joining
the Algerian National Liberation Front to support
Algeria’s War of independence from France.
Freire gave the name conscientizaçao to the
transformative process of interacting with other
individuals and other communities[82, 83], translated as
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critical consciousness, or more literally as
“conscientization”, and sometimes as consciousnessraising[84].⑤ From there, others have continued to
systematically develop tools, strategies, and methods for
critical consciousness, including dialogue and critical
reflection, reflective questioning, psychosocial support,
co-learning, group processes, civic engagement and
sociopolitical action, and identity development[34].
Critical consciousness has inspired a field within
education known as critical pedagogy[86] which has been
carried forward particularly in adult education[4] and has
had a large impact on the development of Participatory
Action Research[87] and Community Based Participatory
Research[88].
Positionality is awareness and discussion of ones’
social and institutional position with regards to research,
particularly of power imbalances, and limitations the
researcher may have because of differences in lived
experience.
Reflexivity is the process of “turning back on” and
reflecting on experience and our positionality. For
example, in anthropology, this is researchers being
explicit about their emotions and how they related to
research subjects[89]. Positivism, in particular, does not
and cannot engage in reflexivity[90], since it holds that
knowledge is independent of the knowledge-holder.
Participatory paradigms address an important moral
aspect lacking in both critical theory and constructivism.
Certain streams of critical theory frequently have a
condescending aspect to them: that people are unaware
of their own oppression, and it is the role of the critical
theorist to educate them. On the other hand,
constructivism does not account for experiential
knowing[90]. Building explicitly from the ideas of Freire,
participatory paradigms value and highlight experience,
following a methodology that challenges hierarchies
between teacher and student, or researcher and subject,
and seeks to construct knowledge collectively. Its
methodology and axiology prioritize understanding and
improving the world by changing it through collective,
reflexive inquiry[91].
This paradigm has a relativistic component in seeing
knowledge as malleable and multiple rather than
absolute and singular; by locating value in others and
their experiences, rather than seeing the status of
⑤ Consciousness-raising also appears, without reference to Freire, in
US feminist movements in the 1960s[85].
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knowledge as the most important thing in life, the
instability of knowledge does not become a reason to be
nihilistic.
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